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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-2835 
______________ 
 
JENNIFER MURPHY,  
                                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF LEWES; PAUL ECKRICH; JEFFERY HORVATH;  
JAMES L. FORD, III; THEODORE W. BECKER; VICTOR LETONOFF; 
FRED W. BEAUFAIT; BONNY OSLER; LIEUTENANT JAMES AZATO 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
(D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01048) 
District Judge: Hon. Richard G. Andrews 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 9, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jennifer Murphy contends that she was entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause before being terminated as an employee of the city of Lewes, Delaware 
(“Lewes”).  The District Court held that Murphy lacked a property interest in her 
employment and thus was not entitled to such a hearing and dismissed her Amended 
Complaint.  We will affirm. 
I 
We draw the following facts from Murphy’s Amended Complaint, accepting them 
as true in accordance with our standard of review.  Lewes hired Murphy as a secretary on 
June 12, 1998.  From June 23, 2009, Murphy was subject to the Lewes “personnel 
policy” (the “Policy”).  App. 31.  Murphy acknowledged “receipt” of the Policy, which 
stated that the Policy “is intended as a guide” for employees.  App. 65.  Murphy also 
acknowledged: “I . . . understand that my employment relationship with [Lewes] is an at-
will relationship and I may choose to end the employment relationship at any time, just as 
[Lewes] may end the employment relationship at any time.”  Id. 
The Policy sets forth Lewes’s expectations for its employees, including that they 
obey all laws, ordinances, and policies, and “be free from the influence of drugs . . . while 
they are on duty” (generally, the “drug rules”).  App. 57.  The Policy notifies employees 
that they are subject to disciplinary action up to dismissal for noncompliance, which is 
the maximum discipline for violation of the drug rules.  Specifically, Section 6-1(B)(8), 
the Policy’s “Disciplinary Action” section, provides that “any employee may be 
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dismissed for . . . misconduct . . . in the opinion of the City Manager when, given the 
nature of the offense, other personnel actions would be inappropriate,” and states that 
being under the influence of drugs while on duty provides “cause for dismissal.”  App. 
60-62.  The Policy sets a minimum punishment for violation of the drug rules.  Section 4-
14(D)(3)(c), the “Substance Abuse” section, provides that “[e]mployees who have a 
verified first time positive result for illegal drugs will be suspended for thirty (30) days 
without pay, counseled and given the opportunity to enter a treatment program at their 
own expense,” and that “[r]efusal to enter treatment will be grounds for immediate 
dismissal.”  App. 57, 59. 
The Policy also provides that, before taking disciplinary action, Lewes must 
provide the employee notice of the type of discipline being considered, the reason for it, 
and an opportunity for the employee to provide facts and to discuss the proposed 
discipline.  Thereafter, the employee is to be provided a written decision and an 
opportunity to appeal. 
In August 2012, Murphy underwent a random drug screening that produced a 
positive result, and she was “suspended . . . and put on administrative leave” without an 
opportunity for counseling, treatment, or a hearing.  App. 34.  Following a meeting of the 
Lewes Town Council,1 Murphy’s employment was terminated on September 10, 2012. 
Murphy filed an Amended Complaint against Lewes and eight individual 
defendants (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging, among other things, that she was 
                                                 
1 Murphy does not allege whether she received notice of this meeting. 
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deprived of her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.2  The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that 
neither Delaware law nor the Policy gave Murphy a property interest in continued 
employment with Lewes such that she was entitled to pre-termination due process.  
Murphy appeals.3 
II 
 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deprivations of “property, without due 
process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Murphy’s constitutional claim turns on 
whether “she possessed a property interest in her job that was deserving of due process 
protection.”  Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005).  Such a property 
interest must be something “more than a unilateral expectation of continued 
employment;” rather, it must take the form of “a legitimate entitlement to such continued 
employment.”  Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972)).  Such a “legitimate entitlement” may be the product of state law, id., or of other 
“rules or mutually explicit understandings,” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 
(1972). 
                                                 
2 The other counts of the Amended Complaint were voluntarily dismissed. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  This 
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, accepting the facts alleged in the 
Amended Complaint as true.  Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 
694 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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 Murphy lacked a property interest in continued employment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as neither Delaware law nor the Policy creates a legitimate entitlement to 
continued employment.  Under Delaware law, there is “a heavy presumption that a 
contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in nature with 
duration indefinite.”  Bailey v. City of Wilmington, 766 A.2d 477, 480 (Del. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, Murphy was explicitly told in connection with 
her receipt of the Policy that her employment was “at-will,” App. 65, and nothing in the 
Policy itself contradicts this.  See Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 
(Del. 1982) (rejecting argument that “Employee Information Booklet” altered at-will 
employment relationship where the Booklet “was a unilateral expression of the 
defendant’s policies and procedures” and did “not grant to any employee a specific term 
of employment”).  Lewes unilaterally issued the Policy for the guidance and benefit of its 
employees.  Nothing therein granted a term of employment and thus it did not “alter 
[Murphy’s] ‘at-will’ employment status.”  Id.  Thus, because “as a matter of state law 
[Murphy] held [her] position at the will and pleasure of [Lewes,] . . . [s]he had no 
property interest” in her position sufficient to entitle her to due process.  Bishop v. Wood, 
426 U.S. 341, 345 n.8 (1976) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
 Furthermore, the Policy’s inclusion of a notice and hearing procedure did not 
create a property interest.  While it set forth a process for taking disciplinary action, it did 
not curtail Lewes’s right to take such action.  Moreover, although the Policy included a 
minimum disciplinary sanction for a positive drug test that is less than termination, the 
6 
 
Policy also made clear that Lewes reserved the right to terminate the employee.  Finally, 
Murphy’s allegation that, “[u]pon information and belief,” “no employee of . . . Lewes 
has been involuntarily terminated without the procedures” set forth in Section 6.1 of the 
Policy, App. 34, does not undermine the at-will nature of her employment.  Even if 
procedural protection was normally afforded to Lewes employees, this Court has 
explained that, “[w]here the substantive standards for employee discharge are 
ambiguous,” the existence of “procedural protections” granted to government employees 
“may shed light on the intention of the legislature concerning these standards.”  Blanding 
v. Pa. State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1306 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993).  But the nature of the 
employment relationship here and the standards governing it are not ambiguous.  Murphy 
was an at-will employee and subject to discharge even without cause. 
 Because Murphy’s allegations do not overcome the record showing that she was 
an at-will employee, the District Court appropriately concluded she had no property 
interest triggering a due process right and correctly dismissed her § 1983 claim. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
